

# Between the Myth of Development and the Development of Myth: Futures of Islamic Banking in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

*“Whenever truth has been spoken to power, the response has been an attack on truth” (Shrii Sarkar)*

Nedal El-Ghattis  
Faculty of Business Bahrain Polytechnic  
Kingdom of Bahrain

---

## Abstract

*This paper deals with the reality of development challenges in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCCC), and the impact of these on the future of Islamic banking. Using Causal Layered analysis (CLA), the hidden stories of economic development (ED) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are unpacked. The three narratives presented here are that of the ED of GCC as: (1) Rentier State and Neopatrimonialism (2) Dubai-zation (3) Halal Economy.*

**Keywords:** CLA, Economic Development, Futures Studies, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Islamic Banking, Rentier State

---

## Introduction and Research Methodology

The economic path that has been followed by GCC countries involves many problems and contradictions; this has had a major impact on the success of the entire development process (Ben Gaith, 2015). These are attributable to a set of overlapping factors, primarily internal (but also external by extension). At the forefront are political and institutional issues which relate to the nature of power and to styles of governance. Political authoritarianism is a major factor in the failure to achieve sustainable economic development in the region (Al Yousif, 2011) through well thought-out and clear policies where the priorities and objectives of public interest precede personal narrow interest. Thus, irrational policies will necessarily reflect negatively on the

future of Islamic banking if not addressed, and with corrective measures taken.

My goal is not to predict the future development of the region, but rather, benefiting from the work of Sohail Inayatullah, to dive from the surface of studied phenomenon or litany (the day to day visible and objective presentation of data) to systemic causes (the interrelated parts that comprise the issue) and then go further to examine worldviews (or the interest and perspectives of stakeholders). Finally, I examine the unconscious; the myths and metaphors that support and provide meaning to the entire framework (Inayatullah, 2004).

In order to understand ED in the GCC countries and its impact on Islamic finance, Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) will be used to construct alternative deeper policy options after deconstructing the underlying dominant stories (Inayatullah, 2010). Rigorous Futures understandings require the exploration of deeper aspects of reality and change processes (Ramos, 2003). This, however, is not an argument for a new “story of stories” or a historical blend of various grand narratives. We must remember that “*stories come into being because they represent long battles, deep histories, heroic sacrifices, and primal myths*” (Inayatullah, 1995, online). Though the stories that explain economic development in the GCC countries are multifold, three can be seen as foundational:

- (1) Rentier State and Neopatrimonialism
- (2) Dubai-zation
- (3) Halal Economy (Islamisation of the economy)

Many Arab intellectuals and economists of the twentieth century have tried to present a variety of critiques and solutions in the face of problematic development in the Arab world. Usama Abdulrahman (2003), in his book “Development of Backwardness and Management of Development” condemned developmental policies that did not address problematic issues. Gahzi Alqusaibi (2004) who worked as the Industry and Electricity minister in Saudi Arabia and also as a Health Minister in the latter part of his career, highlighted the value of public participation and political freedom, and the importance of these to the wider concept of development. Yousef A-ssayegh (1992) analysed economic and social policies, though these lacked depth in their analysis of intellectual currents and prevailing economic thinking (see “Insurmountable Development”). The efforts of Burhan Dajani (1992), former president of the Federation of the Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture and Antoine Zahlan (1999, 2012) who explained in detail the causes of Arab scientific and technological backwardness should also be noted. Georges Corm’s (1981) book “Lost Development”; contributed valuable perspectives on the realities of Arab development, especially in the Gulf region. Corm argues that in spite of the huge economic opportunities enjoyed by the countries of the Arab region/the GCC countries, these countries have not succeeded in launching a renaissance of economic, scientific and technological dimensions that can compete with the rest of the world (Corm, 2011, p.7). All of these thinkers critiqued the Rentier Economy, and all of these contributions focused on the damage of rentier economy.

The concept of a rentier state has gained renewed interest with the advent of the oil era and the emergence of the new Arab oil-producing states (Bellbawi, 1987). In political science and international theory, a rentier state is a state which generates all

or a substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of natural resources to external consumers (Mahdavy, 1970).

It is relevant to note that despite the disparities that exist between the economic situations of GCC countries, all of the GCC countries are struggling - in varying degrees - to achieve economic growth.

### **Rentier State and Neopatrimonialism**

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a study in 2010 entitled "*the Arab State: Assisting or Obstructing Development*". dealt with governance indicators and their applications in Arab countries as defined by the World Bank. The study concluded that the Arab world lags behind many regions in its achievement of the indicators of good governance (Salem, 2010, p. 1). Although achievement of these indicators is key to improving peoples' live. Arab states (and GCC nations) are classified low in rank on most indicators of corporate governance adopted by the World Bank including: freedom of expression and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of corruption (World Governance Indicators, online).

Since the formation of these countries from the pre-modern era to the present time, the presence of ruling families and dynasties has been a constant in the development of the states of the GCC. This has led to a polarisation and concentration of power, contributing to weaker economic development. Thus, systems of governance in the region do not support alternative ideology or thought, but rather aim to strengthen and consolidate the political status of ruling families, and preserve peoples' loyalty to these (Ghalioun, 2012).

The GCC countries are influenced by three characteristics: the economic, the social and the cultural. These are reflected through systems of governance which are: tribal, hereditary, and rentier economy. These produce authoritarian rule, which enjoys unlimited powers. Social structures based on tribal affiliation add legitimacy and create loyalty to the ruling establishment, more so than forced loyalty achieved through security institutions and political oppression (Billingsley, 2010). Hereditary rule alongside rentier economic activity reproduces existing conditions, and this discourages civic mobilisation and opposition - as long as there is money bestowed on citizens. Aldswqi (2015) summarizes this political situation in the countries of the Arab Gulf states as: there is a "*social contract, between the state and citizens, in which the state provides social services in exchange for political submission*" (2015, p. 80).

It is in this context, that Korany (*Arab Human Development in the 21st Century: The Primacy of Empowerment*, 2014) describes the three problems of the so-called "*neo-patrimonial clientalistic*" (p. 32) pattern of government that affects the development process of the Arab region, namely:

1. The rendering or reduction of the State to the provision of security, and the failure of other aspects of state functioning, created by an absence of political legitimacy, and uneasy relationships with external powers which enable the presence of the ruling junta.
2. The challenge of managing internal differences within such fragile states, where disputes of any kind are exacerbated and difficult to control.
3. Low levels of social investment, which relate mainly to a lack of harmony

and community cohesion, leading to a general weakness in the organisation of civil society (2014, p. 32-33).

Thus, although the economies of the Gulf States appear to be stronger than other economies, this strength functions only at the level of overt social litany. If we delve further than the surface and the apparent until we reach the systemic, we find that these countries are characterized by the same properties as economically underdeveloped countries. These revolve around:

1. The retardation of social, political and intellectual conditions, and the spread of customs and traditions that stand in the way of overall development requirements.
2. Lack of freedom, for freedom 'is development' as stressed by Amartya Sen (1999).
3. Technical and technological backwardness, with much technical and technological value imported from abroad.
4. Backwardness of means of production, poor distribution of wealth and limited investment opportunities. The real estate sector remains the most powerful economic sector, at the expense of other productive sectors.
5. Weakness in the investment of disposable wealth, and the waste of wealth on non-productive "consumer goods".
6. Economic and political subordination to external forces.
7. Growing security issues, alongside a police state mentality in the functioning of state administration.

The GCC region has experienced significant urban growth in various sectors (i.e. construction, architecture, health services and trade) in ways that were almost non-existent in the period before the harvesting of oil. But are these changes real development or just growth? Al-Ghanim (1999) argues that the GCC region has evolved in a quantitative rather than qualitative manner, within the limits of the interests of the ruling establishment. The ruling establishment panics at any change that may affect the status quo. They are anti-democratic and against giving the populace the opportunity to take the reins and change its destiny (Al-Ghanim, 1999, Al Yousuf, 2011)

It should be noted that the rulers in these regions consist of large and diversified families, definitely not a monolithic clique, who rule the countries with relevant exposure to sophisticated political and economic advisors and analyses. However, those advisors are there to assist and guide the rulers in power. Thus, despite all that exposure, as the rules see democracy as a threat to their power and privilege, they are afraid of even minimal, proactive reform due to the very legitimate fear that any reforms toward popular rule would touch off a revolution of rising expectations. These expectations lead invariably to frustration and then aggression as the gap between expectation and realities grows too large.

Acknowledging that sometimes there are ideas for small incremental reform, Hvidt (2013, p. 1) argues that "these regimes easily give up their well-argued and planned policies when under pressure and fall back on established ways of doing business, namely through patronage and the predominant role of public sector." Hence, any effort for diversifying economies through politically difficult economic reform has suffered significant obstacles.

Ali concluded in his study that: “political authoritarianism is the main reason for the failure to achieve human development” (2013, p. 115), and that governments have created a political and economic environment that has contributed to the spread of corruption (Hafiz, 2009). Authoritarian regimes failed to create Arab economic integration, preventing real employment opportunities and capabilities and the promotion of Arab collective self-reliance in order to achieve development outcomes. As stated in a report from the World Bank “Work, Growth, and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa”:

*“The fundamental challenge for development is not technical, although technical issues are important. It is governance— the ways governments interact with citizens and civil society to promote social and economic welfare. Because gaps in economic and social development in MENA are manifestations of an enduring gap in the quality of governance between MENA and better performing countries elsewhere, the region’s economic and social challenges can be viewed largely as a governance challenge, even if better governance is not the only change needed to improve performance. The governance challenge is to strengthen the incentives, mechanisms, and capacities for more accountable and inclusive public institutions and to expand allegiance to equality and participation throughout society. Those good governance mechanisms are first steps in improving economic policies that are themselves instruments for improving the climate and incentives for efficient growth.” (The World Bank, 2003, p. 34).*

Politics in the region are practiced as a kind of exclusionary selfish competition; or as Al-Hashemi calls it “*Syndrome Booty*” (Alnaqieb, 2008, p. 9). Research by de Mesquita and Root (2002), entitled “*the Political Roots of Poverty*”, describes how tyrannical systems of governance seek to purchase cooperation by enriching a class within society and retaining the loyalty of that class, at the expense of ordinary peoples aspirations. This kind of systemic corruption is observable in the regimes of Arab countries, entirely ruining “good governance”. It results in what Yusuf Khalifa Al Yousuf (2004, p. 580) calls “*Imperfect Citizenship*”; a situation where the relationship between the government and the rest of the people is not characterized by shared responsibility and partnership, but rather by subordination and submission.

This leads us to the most important problem experienced by the Gulf economies: namely the dominance of the rentier economy in all aspects of economic life. By rentier: I mean income generated by individuals or groups which is not directly linked to productive or socially useful work. The dominance of these forms of income has established political despotism, and widened the gaps between elites and common classes within societies (Barakat, 2000, p. 937). Because societies are kept under the domination of the distribution of sources of rentier wealth, ordinary people remain submissive and do not seek any political freedoms.

The rentier economy has become an important obstacle; one that has prevented the search for economic alternatives. As a system, it has strengthened a generally superficial culture which avoids dealing with real problems within societies, and it has created a worldview that has retarded the development of Gulf States.

The essential trait of the GCC countries is imposed authoritarian monopoly, or as it has been historically expressed, the “mandate of the triumphant” (Ibn Khaldun, 2004, Vol 1, p. 272).

The origin of the rentier state in the GCC countries has been the availability of huge oil and gas reserves. In this regard Murad states that: “the gross domestic product in each country of the GCC is not subject to labor force as the basis of the total production elements, but basically is linked to the resources of oil and its derivatives and other natural resources and wealth” (2015, p. 83). In his important book on economic development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Aldekhil (2012) argue that government economic and fiscal policies often give precedence to consumption over investment. Saudi Arabia, a major GCC country (in terms of area, population and income) depends almost entirely on oil revenues (as does the rest of the Gulf). He further states that the results of development plans have been modest, and never live up to the level of original ambitions (Aldekhil, 2012, p. 847).

Since the mid-eighties of the last century, a prevailing view has been that of ‘oil as a curse’ - because it leads to weak economic growth rates (which affect the well-being of society in the long run), for its contribution to the creation of a rentier state which is controlled by a specific group of families, and because it impacts accountability and accounting systems, alongside the absence of taxes (Knack, 2008).

It is not just the warnings of secular economists that describe oil is a curse; the Quran (a text that is foundational in GCC countries) also highlights the dangers: for example, there are many warnings in the Quran advising individuals not to be subjected to the rule of Juggernauts - or gatekeepers of money and power (Quran 2:256, 2:257, 4:60, 4:51). Tyranny, despotism and oppression is the process of seizing material goods which belong to society at large. Many societies have been destroyed by the unwarranted control of resources by a small minority, and corruption at the expense of the majority. God Almighty gives this parable in the Quran (22: 45): “And how many a city did We destroy while it was committing wrong – so it is [now] fallen into ruin – and [how many] an abandoned well and [how many] a lofty palace”. This is a Quranic example of a village which lacks the elements of community solidarity. The well here is abandoned, but a palace is built next to it. This is a symbol of wide social differences in the same society. The powerful wealthy live in a palace, while the community’s energies and its bounty are represented by the simple well. This metaphor reflects the development of the Gulf situation.

Arab oil is still beyond national control; the oil industry has not been subjected to development and reform considerations. In spite of the paramount importance of oil as a source of income, there is a lack of national oil policies for economic development, and the pattern of oil development fluctuates between the loss of opportunities for development and pattern of development of loss (Al Kuwari, 1996). The prevailing pattern of development does not amount to a development process; it does not maintain the higher interests of the society, but is dominated by unthinking volatility and unthinking methodology. Improvements in the economic situation of countries in the region has been the result of oil boom conditions, not as a result of serious improvements in economic development planning. There is a rich literature dealing with “the resource curse” and how oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule (Wright, Frantz, & Geddes, 2015; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Wiens, 2014).



Despite the need for alternatives to oil revenue, consumerist trends have contributed to missed opportunities in the development of alternatives to the oil production base. A conference between GCC member states in Abu Dhabi in 1998, led to the establishment of a long-term development plan which was to be implemented between 2000 to 2025. To date, despite the high hopes of ordinary people, key aspects of the plan have failed to be effectively implemented (Al Kuwari, 2009).

Regimes in Arab countries have been dominated by the control of ageing leaders, despite the fact that more than half the population in the region is below thirty years old. This makes for rigid and backward policy decisions within societies with volcanic tendencies; thus there can be no economic empowerment, or equitable and sustainable development without the restructuring of political thought which governs Arab countries (Korany, 2014, p. 27).

There is nothing more important for the largest economies in the region than the establishment of a productive capitalist income capable of replacing petroleum income (Aldekhil, 2012, p. 847). As stated in the Arab Human Development Report (2004), a continuation of the current situation, which unites developmental deficits, oppression within nation states and exposure to outside influences, could lead to the deepening of societal conflict within Arab countries. This prophecy was fulfilled in 2010 with the onset of the Arab revolutions that are still impacting the region today. Political development is a pre-requisite for economic development; political development provides guarantees for the regularity of economic activity through systematic reconstruction (Belbawi, 1999, pp. 57-75).

Table 1. *CLA- Rentier state, and neopatrimonialism*

Level of Reality	Deconstruction – The Problem	Reconstruction – The Solution
Litany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Rentier state</li> <li>– Running the state with tribal mentality and hereditary rule</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Good governance</li> </ul>
Systemic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Juggernaut rule</li> <li>– Consumerist societies vs. productive societies</li> <li>– Forfeiture of freedoms</li> <li>– Weakening of institutions</li> <li>– The institutionalization of hereditary system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Supremacy of the law</li> <li>– Actualisation of human rights and the role of civic institutions</li> </ul>
Worldview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Quantitative not qualitative growth in the interest of the dominant class</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Accounting of output</li> <li>– Serious long-term development plans</li> <li>– Progressive cooperative system/Progressive Utilization Theory – Sarkar</li> </ul>
Myth-Metaphor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Money in exchange for silence (we give you economic development in exchange for cooperation)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Day of reckoning</li> </ul>

## Dubai-zation

An-N'eem describes in a sardonic manner the rapid changes that have occurred in the Gulf cities in recent decades: "the city in the Gulf is a project or an idea of the government, not of the inhabitants" (Al-Kuwari, 2009, p. 310). The city is a huge urban space with hardly any relationship to its inhabitants' standards and common values. Or as described by Inayatullah: "face-less communities pretending to be in relationship with each other" (1999, p. 4), these cities lack "public participation" in their decision-making processes and futures. This situation has been described as "oil urbanization" (A Al-Kuwari, 2009, p. 312).

Many of the capitals of the Gulf States are trying to follow the example of the city of Dubai: seeking to have the worlds tallest buildings, the most luxurious hotels, the largest shopping centers, the largest airports, etc, etc. This desire to create 'globalised cities' has become known as the "Ad-debieneh" or 'Dubai-tization'. Some seek to promote a trend of 'remarkable success stories', alternatively, this can be viewed as the cheap promotion of ruling regimes (Al Yousuf, online). This tendency extends beyond the Gulf and included Baku, Azerbaijan that seeks to become "The Dubai of Caucasus" and Addis Ababa as "The Dubai of Africa".

Al Naeem describes examples like the city of Dubai, as "cities without memory, where it is difficult to build a relationship with a place within it" (Al-Kuwari, 2009, p.323). This is a distorted model of a city, which is nonetheless intended to be universally relevant. On the level of litany, unofficial policy adopted by the Government is based on the idea of the "new and exciting", with a focus on near-term commercial benefits which overlook future effects (Al-Kuwari, 2009, p. 324). The leadership of the city of Dubai tried to diversify the economies of the city beyond oil revenue, thus achieving remarkable successes by focusing on investment in financial services, merchandise-shopping, tourism, trade, air transport, and especially re-export. Because of this, Dubai has become a growth model for neighboring countries (Hvidt, 2007). However, this did not prevent it from getting into a severe crisis that affected its reputation as an attractive city for investment. Dubai is not a model for a complete national economy; it is one city in the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates. In Salim Al-Hoss' opinion, the financial crisis that caused a resounding impact in 2008 on Dubai would not have happened, if it were part of a larger economic entity that could temper such crises (Eskandar, 2010, p.86).

The city was managed as a company, relied on external financing, and expanded its debt to an extent that led to an explosion in 2008 (Eskandar, 2010, p. 87). Thus, the Dubai model as presented by Issa has inherent structural defects which makes Dubai a center for services that are isolated from other sectors of the economy (Eskandar, 2010, p.104) meaning the country's economic growth was greater than its capabilities and was not commensurate with available human resources. Nonetheless, the Dubai city model has enjoyed popularity and wide acceptance. It has attracted both tourists and commerce - a fact that would have been less stark if not for the failure of neighboring countries models for growth.

Viewed from the level of systematic causation, Ghassan Tahboub frames the situation to the contrary. He argues that the growth of Dubai has provided a commendable example, in light of an Arab region that is behind the times. He sees certain mistakes as inevitable, and believes that it is an economic model that is



worth spreading (Eskandar, 2010, p. 93). Abdul Khaleq Abdullah also argues that Dubai's model for success is distinctive for the region: the creation of Dubai as a services hub for the entire Middle East, with an economy that has diversified beyond a dependence on oil. Although the Dubai crisis was due to heavy reliance on foreign debt to finance projects (alongside real estate investment) problems and challenges are to be considered within their context and general framework, with the overall aim of reviewing and reforming the model (Eskandar, 2010, p. 95-97).

Demographics in Gulf societies also suffer from major imbalances between the number of citizens and the number of expatriates - with the estimated number of expatriate workers being more than half of the population (Alzubi, 2015, p. 106, Hvidt, 2007). This heavy reliance on foreign labor drains the local economy through workers' remittances to their respective homelands (Alhety, 2013, p. 56). It also threatens security and social cohesion (Alzubi, 2015, p. 56). Public policies for development are often superficial and do not take into account complex social systems. Steady increases in population in emerging petroleum cities have led to significant demographic imbalances; when decision-makers do not care about this adequately it can become a "ticking time bomb" (Alzubi, 2015, p. 313).

There were positive aspects to the global financial crisis of 2008: it sounded an alarm, a strong alert to rethink the development models that followed. The financial crisis experienced by the Emirate of Dubai as a consequence of the global financial crisis has demonstrated that the GCC is an incoherent entity. None of the GCC countries stood by Dubai during the crisis except the oil-rich emirate of Abu Dhabi. Even Abu Dhabi's stance was marked by a timidity which characterized the fragility and vulnerability of the UAE Union.

Vacillation of loyalties and rivalries between the capitals of the Gulf States must be transformed. The Gulf States must move from competition to cooperation. Dubai's model is, on the whole, not a viable model for imitation within the region. Ultimately, it is a globalized model lacking in cultural identity - particularly important since the idea of cultural identity dominates thinking within the region. If we compare the development of Singapore with the development of Dubai, we find that within Singapore decision-making occurred within the "incubator" of that society's institutional environment. The development of Singapore relied on local manpower, under lesser degrees of financial and administrative corruption. This is not the situation in Dubai, where decision making is extremely centralized and occurs between a limited number of people (Huff, 1995, p. 737; Davis & Hayashi, 2007; Hvidt, 2007).

People are hungry for change, for real industrial development projects, which engage the hands of nationals. But instead, we see the creation of superficial mirages that do not quench thirst nor satisfy hunger. This is reminiscent of a metaphor from the Qur'an: *"... their deeds are like a mirage in a lowland, where a thirsty one thinks he sees water until, when he comes close, he finds no water, but finds there God before him. He will pay him in full, for God is swift in accountability"* (Quran 24: 39).

Table 2. *CLA – Dubai-tization story*

Level of Reality	Deconstruction – The Problem	Reconstruction – The Solution
Litany	Oil-based urbanization, Dubai as Pearl of the Gulf, The new and exciting	Focus on investment quality, long-term investment
Systematic	Early depletion of oil Geographical location	Robust economy Far-reaching socio-economic reforms
Worldview	Walt Disney - style development: innovation of excitement Globalization with loss of identity Westernization The ‘universal’ city	Singaporean model More focused on sustainability/ exploring alternative growth models A move from the corporatist model to a cooperative model, Innovative and incentive based economy
Myth-Metaphor	Showoff I shop therefore I am Mirage development The spirit of the rapid gain Petro-dollar cities	Work for worldly gains as if you will live forever

## Islamic Halal Economy

Economic development from an Islamic perspective is based on the moral reconciliation between various aspects of life, and takes into account the cultural, political, social and security dimensions of development (Youce, 2010, p. 65; Chapra, 1984, p. 3). Underdevelopment is the most visible phenomenon in Muslim-majority societies (Ahmed, 1980). In his view, overall development is based on doctrinal objectives with “missionary” dimensions - such as monotheism, the caliphate, urbanization and purification of “the self”. In his book “Islam and Economic Challenges” Chapra (who received the King Faisal International Prize for his economic contribution) argues that Moslems seek an economic system rooted in Islamic law, and that development goals in Islam are not only physical, but seek to achieve a balance with the spiritual goals of human beings (Chapra, 1996, pp. 34-35; Donia, 1993, p. 1139).

These ethics as advocated by Moslems form a philosophical barrier preventing GCC states from adopting Western development models. The Islamic concept of economic development has been further articulated in important works by Chapra (1993, 2000, 2008). Chapra concludes that: “If Islamic countries do not apply the concepts of Islamic teachings to their economies and societies, they will not be able to...rectify imbalances, and achieve the kind of development envisioned in Islam” (Chapra, 1996, p. 416). In this vein, Al-Ghazali regards development in its Islamic framework as based on: the deputization of mankind, the colonization of the Earth, the implementation of Zhakat obligation (benevolent giving), investment based on priorities and needs, equitable distribution of wealth and the creation of the brotherhood, and charity (Ghazali, 1987).

Hence, we note that development from an Islamic perspective is dramatically focused on ethics, and this is what distinguishes it from other forms of development (Naqvi, 1981). It seeks to achieve (the so-called) supreme purposes and values of Shari'a (Ahmed, 2004, p. 75). Muslims theorists believe that economic cyclical crises are the echo of human suffering, and that these are caused by the same spiritual and moral crises (Al-Qaradawi, 1995; Mohamed Qutb, 1993; Sayyid Qutb, 2006.). Accordingly, they argue that crises will continue unless the needs of people are placed at the centre of development goals, and spiritual and social values given value over aggressive capitalist approaches to development (Youcef, 2010, p. 76).

Hence, Moslems believe that regimes that embody inherent contradictions between their goals and their general approach, will not be able to meaningfully restructure their economies - and that the imperfections of these systems stems from the inside (Chapra, 1996, pp. 33-34).

Some suggest that in order to make Islamic financial institutions a reality, Islamic values must spread, and that bias and corrupt ethical values are the ills that undermine justice and effective development in Islamic countries (Chapra, 2004, p. 432). The purpose of Islamic economics is thus a missionary task to transform societies for the better. In his famous book, "Our Economy" Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr says that: "the economic development process is not a process practiced, adopted and legislated by the state, but is a process that must be shared by (and contributed to) by the whole nation" (1987, p. 16).

Unfortunately, there are strong indicators that decision-makers in Muslim majority countries are not truly committed to applying the values and ethics of Islam to development goals and policies (Ahmad, 1980, p. 173). There is a wide gap between the spirit of the religion and the actual practices of Muslims; Islamic societies do not reflect the spiritual and moral glory of Islam. For example, a study conducted by George Washington University has concluded that: "Looking at an index of Economic Islamicity", or how closely the policies and achievements of countries reflect Islamic economic teachings - Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, Norway, and Belgium round up the first ten" (McElroy, online). According to this leading report the first Muslim-majority nation is Malaysia ranking at 33, while the only other state in the top 50 is Kuwait at 48!

Religion is a pivotal influence for the peoples of the Gulf, and is a major factor in the formation of their awareness and vision of life. This religiosity can be liturgical and superficial in nature, focusing often on formalities (Hamed, 2004). Consequently, religious ideology often fails to address real problems in the arenas of economy, politics and sociology.

At this level "litany" can be viewed as: a prevailing religious discourse which asserts that the cause of developmental retardation is the abandonment of a heritage of religious authenticity, particularity in the context of globalization and the adoption of western lifestyles as a model for emulation. Rulers are seen as not governing by and through Islamic law in different arenas of life. This ideological perception is deeply rooted in superficiality, or as described by Georges Corm "an expression of the desire of a rank of intellectuals in maintaining doctrinal authority within the community" (2011, p.27). It is an escape from reality to dreams, wishes and slogans.

Islamic Banks do not operate in an ideological vacuum. The most important of the Islamic banking and monetary system objectives, as seen by some of the most

significant promoters of the idea of Islamic economics and Islamic banking are (Siddiqi, 1981; Kahf, 1998):

- Economic well-being, with wide, full employment and an optimum economic growth rate.
- Economic and social justice, equitable distribution of income and wealth.
- Stability in the value of money.
- The generation of savings, intelligently invested.
- The provision of services that are to be expected from an effective banking system.

The establishment of genuine Islamic banking would be a novel development, if it were to be developed in relation to the theoretical concepts upon which it has been defined. Islamic Banking requires a revolutionary change in the innovative environment and its support systems. Because of the political and social conditions of the Gulf region, a push is being made by the anti-freedom forces to undermine the authentic components of this model.

Social justice cannot be discussed in a context of repression and political oppression, in situations where the distribution of wealth is concentrated in specific families, nor when the diversification of investment and the implementation of Islamic financial instruments is defined by the absence of a political will to steer capabilities and resources in the best interests of the country. The problem of incubating good Islamic banking systems arises not from a lack of resources, but through poor economic policies within the GCC countries. These hinder the growth of Islamic economies and Islamic banking.

In a new development that may serve and support Islamic banking Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai (during the global Islamic summit of November 2013) announced that Dubai would become a capital of Islamic Economics, and that the emirate would aim to become the Shari'a - compliant center of the world (Gulf Business, 2013). The head of the Emirates Authority for Standardizations and Metrology, Abdulla Al Muaini, pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation values the global halal sector at \$2.3 trillion. "Halal industry is expected to be one of the steadily growing sectors across the global economy" (The Jordan Times, 2015). This step undertaken by Dubai will undoubtedly support the existence and spread of Islamic banks, but it is uncertain whether the vision of Islamic banking will find its way beyond mere slogans, and be realized in practice!

Indeed, there is a clear conflict between lofty goals and disillusioned realities. Islamic economy is based on the concept of maqasid (the objectives of Islamic law) as described by Imam Al-Shatby (Raissouni, 1995). The basic needs of the community are to be met first (i.e. the necessities). After those are realized, societies can move toward adding complementarities and embellishment (Dusuki & Abozaid, 2007). At present, the reality of development in GCC economies is characterized by a focus on luxuries over basics, dependence over independence and initiative, the power of the influential family instead of care for society as a whole, the cultivation of individual rather than community capital, and the superficial over the substantial.

The problem of Islamic economics and Islamic banking can be traced to two key factors: (1) that of an ideal model trying to find a foothold in a reality that is not ideal, (2) the issue that Islamic banking is often heavily influenced by Western financial systems and approaches, leading to the creation of ostensibly 'Islamic' banking systems and tools that often fails to be authentically 'Islamic'. In fact, the so-called Islamic economy has "failed to escape from the central gravity of Western economic thought" (Nasr, 1991, p. 388).

Yet, significant growth has occurred in the volume and spread of Islamic banking since its inception to the present time (Thomson Reuters, 2013), and this is expected to continue in the next few years (Thomson Reuters, 2015). The factors that led to the growth, increase and acceleration of Islamic banking (including oil wealth and demographic contexts) are still in operation (Kahf, 2001). With all of that, it is still possible to state that growth of the sector has been to large extent due to external drivers (such as oil wealth) rather than because Islamic Banking institutions have put forth models that can truly rival conventional banking systems. There are uncertainties on the magnitude of the growth effect of Islamic banking, which calls for further research. However, Imam and Kpodar (2015) assessed the impact of Islamic banking on economic growth and they found that the impact is measurable; and also they found, Islamic banking has unique features that are highly appropriate for developing countries.

The Islamic banks are very similar to traditional banks. Funding is concentrated on day to day consumption and personal loans, rather than the financing of production and investment. In an interview with AA1 (September 30, 2015) a lecturer in the field of Islamic banks, AA1 stated that he believes that Islamic banks are development neutral - far from being real contributors to the economy, Islamic banks lean towards elitism and away from the needs of the poor.

Instead of linking banking services and rentier capital in the countries of the GCC with local economic activities, capital was often transferred to Western countries and "*consumed in wars, imperialist extortion and class corruption*" (Al-Ghanim, 1999, p. 116). Unfortunately, due to the absence of an industrial production base in the region, those with money in the Gulf States do not invest locally. "*Although GCC SWFs have shown an interest in emerging markets, real estate and other tangible fixed assets in Europe and the US remain popular purchases and this likely to be the case for some time*" (The Economist, 2014, p.28). Additionally, there is a historic correlation and mutual interest between Pharaoh (master of power) and Qaroon (master of funds). This is a key metaphor, one of the famous stories of the Qur'an. This is the conflict between the economics of humanisation and the economics of corruption, and the conflict over resources and capabilities, which manifests itself in the Gulf States.

If Islamic banking is to have value, its advocates and its promoters should focus on development (not just growth) and on inherent economic principles, not just formalities, and on investment projects that meet the needs of the ordinary citizens (not only traders and capitalists). Bankers must open their minds to differing thoughts, opinions and criticism. In order to achieve the development goals of Islamic banking, GCC countries should seek to adopt truly Islamic attitudes towards ethics, wealth distribution, and social and economic justice.

Table 3. *CLA – Halal Economy Story*

Level of Reality	Deconstruction – The Problem	Reconstruction – The Solution
Litany	– Ethical banking, where the system derives its authority from the law	– Values of post-modernism – Humanitarian ethics
Systemic	– Popular religiosity – Financial liquidity	– New Islamic global trading rules
Worldview	– Capitalism in an Islamic mold	– Social and economic justice
Myth- Metaphor	– Islamizaiting economics of corruption – Pharaohs and Qaroons running the government	– He is indeed successful who purifies it (the soul) (Quran 91: 9) – Economics of humanization

## Conclusion: Deepening and Broadening our Mission

These three narratives provide an illustration of the economic development situation in GCC countries. Many other factors (not explored in here) are relevant to the topic, for example: sustainable transformation and foreign power narratives, the emerging peer to peer revolution (Bauwens, 2005) and the empathic civilization (Rifkin, 2010).

Table 4. *CLA- Summarising the Narratives*

	(1) State rentier and neopatrimonialism		(2) Dubai-tization		(3) Halal economy	
Level of Reality	Decon-struction – The Prob-lem	Recon-struction – The Solu-tion	Decon-struction – The Problem	Recon-struction – The Solu-tion	Decon-struction – The Prob-lem	Recon-struction – The Solu-tion
Litany	Rentier State	Good gov-ernance	Dubai pearl of the Gulf	Quality in-vestment	Ethical banking, where the system derives its authority from the law	Human-itarian cosmic ethics
Systemic	Juggernaut rule	Suprema-cy of the law	Early depletion of oil	Real econ-omy	Popular religiosity	New Islamic global trading rules



Worldview	Quantitative growth not qualitative growth in the interest of the dominant class	Accounting of output	Walt Disney's development: innovation of excitement	Singaporean model	Capitalism in an Islamic mold	Social and economic justice
Myth-Metaphor	Money in exchange for silence	Day of Reckoning	Mirage development	Work for worldly gains as if you'll live forever	Pharaohs and Qa-rooms running the government	Economics of humanization

In each narrative there are several levels of analysis and overlap. In conclusion: the people of the Gulf States are limited by four main issues: (1) oppressive dictatorship, defined by the control of a small junta of individuals who dominate various levels policy making, governance and economics oligarchy (2) an indulgent approach to consumption (3) a model of unsustainable and distorted economics (4) the issue of third-party interventions that create a loss of political independence.

The GCC countries today are at a crossroads, facing a number of internal and external economic challenges which cannot be overlooked if a bright future for these countries is to be secured. The first challenge is to radically reform the political system so that the people of the region can participate in political decision-making. The second challenge is to diversify local economies beyond oil, and through to the vast opportunities of a technological industrial base. The third challenge is to harness the power of economic cooperation between the countries of the region, and to create a joint investment environment in the GCC which is based on participation and collaboration rather than competition and division. The most important challenge of all is to focus on the real root of human development issues rather than superficialities.

As for external challenges: these are exemplified by the need to reduce external interference in political decision making in the region, the importance of limiting external military presence to avoid further conflicts and rivalries of power, the promotion Arab cooperation, and the value of economically and militarily building the prestige of the region while deterring foreign ambitions.

The model that Islamic economists are trying to promote (through Islamic banking) is a fictional, dreamy concept which functions within an ideal environment. It is good to dream, but it can be more challenging to transform dreams into income generating realities which create prosperity and promote meaningful development.

Poverty and political marginalization will lead to a state of oppression and economic marginalization. The idea of Islamic banking will not be able to spread and strengthen without radical political, economic and societal reforms.

I emphasise on these five policy recommendations to enhance economic development and strengthen Islamic banking:

- Rethink economic development: from a corporate mentality to a cooperative, human-centered approach.
- Apply foresight - use foresight as a meta tool for regional development in the future.
- Embrace culture change: shift from a 'rentier' to a 'production' mentality
- Move from competitiveness to co-operation between the Gulf States.
- Emphasize a citizen-based approach: As public participation are important for reflecting the political, economic and social preferences and priorities of the citizens. The inclusion of the people in the decision making process can contribute to transparency and accountability to achieve greater efficiency in the economic development, "by giving individuals and communities more power to change the future" (Inayatullah, 1999, p. 3).

## Correspondence

Nedal El-Ghattis  
 Faculty of Business  
 Bahrain Polytechnic  
 PO Box 33349, Isa Town, Kingdom of Bahrain  
 E-mail: nedal3@gmail.com

## References

- Abdulrahman, Usamah. (2003). *Development of backwardness and management of development, management of development in the Arab World and the international system*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Ahmad, Khurshid. (1980). Economic development in an Islamic framework. In Khurshid Ahmad (Ed.), *Studies in Islamic Economics*. Leicester, England: The Islamic Foundation and Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdul Aziz University.
- Al Gosaibi, Ghazi. (2004). *Development... main questions*. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute of Arab Studies and Publications.
- Al Kuwari, Ali Khalifa. (1996). *Development of the loss or the loss of opportunities for development*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Al Kuwari, Ali. (2009). Oil and the requirements of development and reform in the countries of the GCC. *Dr. AlKuwar.net*. Retrieved on September 25, 2015, from <http://dr-alkuwari.net/sites/akak.nsms.ox.ac.uk/files/%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD.pdf>
- Al Yousuf, Yusuf Khalifa (2011). *The Gulf Cooperation Council in the triangle of hereditary, oil, and foreign power*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Al Yousuf, Yusuf Khalifa. (2004). *Case Study of the United Arab Emirates*. Paper presented at the Corruption and Good Governance in the Arab countries: Research of Discussion of Intellectual Symposium Organized by the Center for Arab Unity Studies in collaboration with the Swedish Institute, Alexandria, Arab.

- Aldekhil, Abdulaziz Mohamad. (2012). *Economic development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - Critical Reading*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Alsaqi.
- Aldswqi, Ayman. (2015). The dilemma of stability in the gulf regional system. *Al-mustaqbal Alarabi*. Retrieved on September 20, 2015, from [http://www.caus.org.lb/PDF/EmagazineArticles/mustaqbal\\_434\\_ayman\\_ibraheem\\_aldsouky.pdf](http://www.caus.org.lb/PDF/EmagazineArticles/mustaqbal_434_ayman_ibraheem_aldsouky.pdf)
- Al-Ghanim, Mohamad Salman. (1999). *Al Quran and political economy*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al Farabi.
- Al-Ghanim, Mohamad Salman. (1999). *Al Quran and political economy*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al Farabi.
- Alhety, Abdurahman Nuzad. (2013). GCC countries' role in achieving the global co-operation development. *Ru'a Istrategyeah*. 64-71.
- Ali, Hasanen. (2013). Political dimensions of the crisis of human development in the Arab world (a study of the effects of political authoritarianism in development). In *Economic growth and sustainable development in the Arab countries: The political and social dimensions*. Beirut, Lebanon: Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies.
- Al-Kuwar, Ali Khalifa (Ed.). (2010). *The third oil boom and repercussions of the global financial crisis: The case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Alnaqieb, Khaldoon. (2008). *Society and the state in the Gulf: Deferent prospective*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Al-Qaradawi, (1995). Yusuf. *Ethical role in Islamic economics*. Cairo, Egypt: Maktabat Wahbah.
- Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir. (1987). *Our economy*. Seyria: Dar Al Taruf Lelmatbuat.
- Alzubi, Ali. (2015). *Development policies and the political movement in the Arab World: The case of Kuwait*. Kuwait: The Centre of Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies.
- A-ssayegh, Yousef. (1992). *Insurmountable development*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Barakat, Halim. (2000). *Arab society in the twentieth century*. Beirut, Lebanon: Center for Arab Unity Studies.
- Bauwens, Michel. (2005). P2P and human evolution: Placing peer to peer theory in an integral framework. *Integralworld.net*. Retrieved on November 2, 2015, form <http://www.integralworld.net/bauwens2.html>
- Belbawi, Hazem. (1987). The rentier state in the Arab World. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 9(4), 383-398.
- Belbawi, Hazim. (1999). *State role in economy*. Cairo: Egyptian General Book Authority.
- Ben Gith, Naser. (2015). Gulf State and the oil market: future paths and alternatives. *Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies*. Retrieved on September 1, 2015, from <http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/7248>
- Billingsley, Anthony. (2010). *Political succession in the Arab world: constitutions, family loyalties and Islam*. London/New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics.
- Chapra, M. Umer. (1993). *Islam and economic development: A strategy for development with justice and stability*. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Islamic Research Institute.

- Chapra, M. Umer. (1996). *Islam and economic challenges*. Aman, Jordan: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- Chapra, M. Umer. (2000). *The future of economics*. Leicestershire, UK: The Islamic Foundation.
- Chapra, M. Umer. (2008). *The Islamic vision of development in the light of maqasid al-shariah*. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Development Bank.
- Chapra, Mohamad Omar. (1984). *Money and banking in an Islamic economy*. Jeddah: International Center for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University.
- Corm, George. (1981). *Lost development*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Altaliha.
- Corm, George. (2011). *A criticism of Arab rentier economy*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Dajani, Burhan. (1992). *Through the economic development in the Arab world*. Beirut, Lebanon: The Federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture.
- Davis, Nicholas, Hayashi, Chiemi. (2007). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries and the world: scenarios to 2025: implications for competitiveness. In: *The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2007*, World Economic Forum, Geneva: 129-141.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, & Root, Hilton L. (Summer 2002). The political roots of poverty: the economic logic of autocracy. *National Interest*, no 68.
- Donia, Showke. (1993). Role of state in economic development from the Islamic perspective. In *Development from Islamic prospective*. Amman, 9-12 July, 1991, Vol 2. The Scientific Society for Islamic Civilization Researches.
- Dusuki, Asyraf Wajdi; Abzaid, Abdulazeem. (2007). A critical appraisal on the challenges of realizing maqasid al-shairah in Islamic banking and finance. *International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting*, 15(2): 143-165.
- Eskandar, Marwan. (2010). Dubai and its crisis. *Almusaqbal Alarabi*, 372, 79-112.
- Ghalioun, Burhan. (2012). *The Assassination of mind, the plight of Arab culture between the salafis and dependency*. Casablanca: Almarkaz Althaqafee Alarabi.
- Ghazali, Abdulhamed. (1987). *About the Islamic methodology in economic development*. Almansourah, Egypt: Dar Alwafa.
- Gulf Business. (2013). Can Dubai become the world's leading Islamic business hub?. Retrieved on October 18, 2015, from <http://gulfbusiness.com/articles/intelligence/can-dubai-become-the-worlds-leading-islamic-business-hub/>
- Hafiz, Zaid. (2009). *Economic structure in the Arab countries and the ethics of society*. Beirut, Lebanon: The Arab Anti-Corruption Organization.
- Hamed, Abdullah. (2004). *The problem and the solution*. Beirut, Lebanon: Arab Scientific Publishers.
- Huff, W. G. (1995). What is the Singapore model of economic development?. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 19(6), 735-759.
- Hvidt, Martin. (2007). The Dubai model: an outline of key components of the development-process in Dubai. *Centre of Contemporary Middle East Studies*. Retrieved on October 26, 2015, from [http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om\\_SDU/Centre/C\\_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Working\\_papers/12WP-2007MH1\\_001.pdf](http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Centre/C_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Working_papers/12WP-2007MH1_001.pdf)

- Hvidt, Martin. (2013). Economic diversification in GCC counties: past record and future trends. London: LSE Kuwait Programme in the Gulf States at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Working Paper No. 27. 1-49. Retrieved on January 23, 2016, from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/Economic-diversification-in-the-GCC-countries.pdf>
- Imam, Patrick & Kpodar, Kangni. (2015). Is Islamic banking good for growth?. *International Monetary fund*. Retrieved on January 23, 2015, from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1581.pdf>
- Inayatullah, Sohail (Ed.). (2004). *The causal layered analysis reader*. Taipei, Taiwan: Tamkang University Publications.
- Inayatullah, Sohail. (1995). Beyond the postmodern: any futures possible. *Meta Future*. Retrieved on September 1, 2015, from <http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/Beyond-the-postmodern.htm>
- Inayatullah, Sohail. (1999). Governance in the 21st century. *Meta Future*. Retrieved on October 21, 2015 from <http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/governance-21st-century.htm>
- Inayatullah, Sohail. (2010). Deconstructing and reconstructing the global financial crisis. *Meta Future*. Retrieved on September 1, 2015, from <http://www.metafuture.org/pdf/globalfinance.pdf>
- Islamic Halal Economy Set to Grow -Experts. (2015). *The Jordan Times*. Retrieved on October 18, 2015, from <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/business/islamic-halal-economy-set-grow-%E2%80%94experts#sthash.yqGx66T.dpuf>
- Jensen, Nathan & Wantchekon, Leonard (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(7), 816–841.
- Kahf, Monzer. (1998). The economic role of the state in Islam. *Monzer.kahf.com*. Retrieved on November 1, 2015, from [http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/economic\\_role\\_of\\_state\\_in\\_islam.pdf](http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/economic_role_of_state_in_islam.pdf)
- Kahf, Monzer. (2001). Islamic banks: the rise of a new power alliance of wealth and Shari'ah scholarship. *Monzer.kahf.com*. Retrieved on November 06, 2015, from [http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/The\\_rise\\_of\\_Islamic\\_banks\\_power\\_alliance\\_REVISED-MESA.pdf](http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/english/The_rise_of_Islamic_banks_power_alliance_REVISED-MESA.pdf)
- Knack, Stephen. (2008). *Sovereign rents and the quality of tax policy: an administration* (Working Paper 4773). Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research.
- Korany, Bahrjat. (Ed.). (2014). *Arab human development in the 21st century: the primacy of empowerment*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Mahdavy, Hossein. (1970). The pattern and problems of economic development in rentier states: the case of Iran. In M. A. Cook (Ed.), *The economic history of Middle East* (pp. 428-467). London: Oxford University Press.
- McElroy, Damien. (2014). Ireland 'leads the world in Islamic values as Muslim states lag'. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved on June 10, 2014, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ireland/10888707/Ireland-leads-the-world-in-Islamic-values-as-Muslim-states-lag.html>
- Murad, Mahmoud. (2015). *Population growth and development prerequisites in the GCC States*. Qatar: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
- Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider. (1981). *Ethics and economics: an Islamic synthesis*. Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation.
- Nasr, Seyyed Bali Reza. (1991). Islamisation of knowledge: a critical overview. *Is-*

- Islamic Studies*, Autumn 1991, 387-400.
- Qutb Mohamed. (1993). *Doctrines of contemporary intellectual*. Cairo, Egypt: Dar Alshrooq.
- Qutb, Sayyid. (2006). *The battle between Islam and capitalism*. Cairo, Egypt: Dar Alshrooq.
- Raissouni, Ahmad. (1995). *Nazariyat al maqasid 'ind al imam al Shatibi*. Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- Ramos, Jose. (2003). From critique to cultural recovery: critical futures studies and causal layered analysis. *Foresight International*. Retrieved on September 15, 2015, from [http://foresightinternational.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AFI\\_Monograph\\_02.pdf](http://foresightinternational.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AFI_Monograph_02.pdf).
- Rifkin, Jeremy. (2009). *The empathic civilization*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press
- Salem, Paul. (2010, April). The Arab State: assisting or obstructing development. *Carnegie Endowment*. Retrieved on September 20, 2015, from [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab\\_state\\_devt.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_state_devt.pdf)
- Sen, Amartya. (1999). *Development as freedom*. NY: Knopf.
- Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah (1982). Islamic approaches to money, banking and monetary policy: a review. In M. Ariff (Ed.), *Monetary and fiscal economics of Islam*. Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics.
- The Economist. (2014). GCC trade and investment flows. *Intelligence Unit*. Retrieved on November 02, 2015, from <http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/GCC%20Trade%20and%20investment%20flows.pdf>
- The World Bank. (2003). *Jobs, growth, and governance in the Middle East and North Africa unlocking the potential for prosperity*. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
- Thomson Reuters. (2013). *Mapping Global Islamic Finance Development 2013*. Retrieved on November 05, 2015, from <https://auscifwp.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/icd-islamic-finance-development-report-2013.pdf> Thomson Reuters.
- Thomson Reuters. (2015). Global Islamic asset management outlook 2015. Manama: Bahrain.
- United Nations development programme. (2004). The Arab human development report 2004. *United Nations*. Retrieved on November 3, 2015, from [http://www.un.org/ar/esa/hdr/2004/pdf/HDR04\\_PKA\\_aboutUNDP.pdf](http://www.un.org/ar/esa/hdr/2004/pdf/HDR04_PKA_aboutUNDP.pdf)
- Wiens, David. (2014). Natural resources and institutional development. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 26(2), 197-221.
- World governance indicators. (2015). *World Bank*. Retrieved on September 20, 2015, from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>
- Wright, J., Frantz, E., & Geddes, B. (2015). Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(02): 287-306.
- Youcef, Nasser. (2010). *The dynamic of the Japanese experience in combined development: comparative study in Algeria and Malaysia*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Zahlan, Antoine. (1999). *Arabs and the challenges of science and technology, advancement without change*. Beirut, Lebanon: CAUS.
- Zahlan, Antoine. (2012). *Science, development, and sovereignty in the Arab World*. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.