Ivana Milojević
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This essay investigates detrimental thinking patterns about the future, termed futures fallacies. It is based on an analysis of the existing literature and personal observation. I define futures fallacies in three ways. First, as those thinking patterns that stand in direct contradiction to a truly desired longer-term future. Second, as thoughts and behaviours that are contrary to our best existing evidence, facts, and logic, of relevance to emerging futures. Third, as cognitive frames that ensure chosen strategies fail.
Is the rational real?
“Adam: What was it about Spock that appealed to you?
Sheldon: I think the same thing that appeals to people everywhere, the dream of a cold, rational world entirely without human emotion. Spock came from a planet governed only by logic. You know, on Vulcan, when your brother asks, why are you hitting yourself? The answer is, I’m not. You’re moving my arm. To which he says, fascinating. And then you both watch educational television”.[3]
A dream of a sane world governed by logic and rationality has been the cry of many philosophers’, scientists’ and intellectuals’, including utopians’, for millennia. “What is rational is real and what is real is rational” (Hegel[4]); and “If one devalues rationality, the world tends to fall apart” (von Trier[5]). And yet here we are, in a world run by ‘post-truth’, ‘post-factual’ and ‘post reality’ politics and discourses. Anything goes and no one cares – all of us liberated in our own respective and self-serving bubbles of cognitive dissonance.
But while we think we live in ‘unprecedented’ times, the phenomenon of our collective irrationality and ignorance has bothered many thinkers over millennia. In Western philosophy, for example, it bothered philosophers so much that we have a list of over 200 common logical fallacies – defined as errors in reasoning, false beliefs and bad arguments which are easily disproven when we give our capacity for logic and rationality a chance. In eastern philosophy, our common delusions are seen as being ‘countless’, a phenomenon acting as “the basis for all error and conflict and …contaminated actions” (Kelsang Gyatso, 1990:311). Here delusions are not defined (more narrowly) as a symptom of a medical, neurological, or mental disorder, i.e. as a psychiatric illness, but, more broadly, as “an aspect of the mind that misunderstand the nature of things and deals with people and situations in a mistaken, harmful way, thus resulting in problems and pain” (McDonald, 1984:214).
The Futures
And what about futures thinking? Can we bring rationality into it?
One response is a very decisive no. Since the future is not known, the argument goes, how can anyone pretend that a thinking pattern about the future is ‘mistaken’? By arguing that certain views of the future are ‘delusional’, this means “colonizing the future of others with their own opinion about the future”[6]. We simply cannot study the future “rationally”, or “scientifically” (Hoos, 1977:335). In fact, “to presume …that we have the techniques and tools to study the future is to delude ourselves, perhaps to the point of disaster…” (Hoos, 1977:343). What are termed futures fallacies in this essay are then in reality merely “the expressions of behaviours that are logically determined by specific worldviews and metaphors”[7].
However, the accurate observation that specific worldviews and metaphors are behind all our behaviour does not mean protection from “errors of judgment and choice, in others and eventually in ourselves” (Kahneman, 2011:4) – narrative is not an excuse for delusion. Or, for that matter, from devastating consequences – two words will suffice here: ‘environmental destruction’. That is, at the very least since 1972, when the bestselling Limits to Growth report was published, we have collectively been warned that it is impossible to have limitless economic growth within a limited ecological space – i.e. planet Earth. But despite some efforts, the global carbon emissions from fossil fuels – one of the factors behind dangerous global heating caused by industrial growth – has more than doubled since the 1970s (EPA, 2019). The increase is exponential – half of the total fossil-fuel CO2 emissions that began with the industrial revolution have occurred since the late 1980s (Boden et al., 2017).
“We should be dealing with climate change with the same urgency we would if another country was to start waging war against us” – a participant at one of our futures workshops shared. “I do not understand why we – all of us – do not do more to change the current trajectory” – puzzled another.
But not only are we, collectively, not really “getting it” or “doing anything substantial about it”, at times we even move in the opposite direction to what evidence, logic and rationality necessitate.
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In light of the current COVID-19 pandemic, we can similarly reflect on previous warnings that were not heard or addressed, or not heard and addressed adequately. For example, in 2011 the OECD, as part of the International Futures Programme, published a report which classified pandemics as a Future Global Shock (Rubin, 2011). They asserted that infectious diseases were “existential threats” to human security as described in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and “reaffirmed in the 2003 UN Commission on Human Security” (Rubin, 2011: 4). While warnings were given, we are yet to globally audit how and why these warnings were not collectively addressed nor alternative pathways taken to avoid the current pandemic. Further research will be needed to ascertain successful and evidence-based (context-dependent) practices in managing this global crisis, including the role foresight in the public sector did, or did not play. Of critical relevance to the argument in this post is the recommendation of the OECD report to use multidisciplinary research frameworks to understand the “mental models of individual decision making in advance of a pandemic” (Rubin, 2011: 81) and other “black swans” (Taleb, 2007) of the future.
In regards to these ‘mental models’, the second response to the question of whether we can bring rationality into our discourses about the future is a resounding yes. That is, we can indeed address various fallacies, biases and incorrect views which are “influencing us to be blind to the obvious, and blind to our blindness” (Kahneman, 2011:24). This is because, while we certainly use various methods to decide on a course of action (or inaction) influencing our futures such as ““habit, social custom, impulse, intuition, procrastination, and avoidance; cogitation, delegation, advice-seeking, and prayer for guidance; consensus, bargaining, mediation, voting, or chance.” (Stone, 2012: 248)” we also use logic and rationality. Furthermore, as a multitude of empirical research confirms, our irrational behaviours are “neither random nor senseless. They are systematic, and since we repeat them again and again, predictable” (Ariely, 2009: xx). Millennia after logical fallacies were identified and disproven, we still engage in them; unless, of course, we are made aware of their existence and alternative, improved, ways of thinking.
What goes for thinking in general, goes for specific thinking about the future as well. ‘Knowledge’ about the future, or even futures is, like any other knowledge “rooted in a life, a society, and a language that [has]history” (Foucault 1973:372). Indeed, truth is never outside of power or lacking in power, as exclaimed by Foucault, which opened the pearly gates of rejecting oppressive discourses espoused by those in power at the expense of the subjugated lot. But when walking through this gate and on the paths enriched by previously suppressed, discounted or creative and novel perspectives we should not also bring along already identified and/or common fallacies and delusions, as they are detrimental to both our present and our futures.
Knowing Futures
As for the future, certainly, we cannot know something which has not yet happened, and so we can never know what exactly the future is to bring. Which does not stop us from thinking about and talking about various futures or from acting for or against specific futures. “Most difficult decisions require making a choice between alternative futures” (Hicks and Holden, 1995:14) but only insofar as we are aware of the existence of these alternative futures in the first place. Instead, most of our futures imagining is commonly “tacit, token and taken-for-granted” (Gough, 1990), that is, implicit and subconscious.
Enter futures fallacies. 200 or so logical fallacies multiply when we think about the future. If we cannot come to agreements when it comes to events that happened or are currently happening, how are we to come to agreements on something that does not exist (yet)? The facts are, “by definition, … of the past” (Wilkinson, 2017: 3). As the future, also by definition, has not happened yet, it “cannot be empirically observed and measured” (Wilkinson, 2017: 3). At the same time, anticipating and influencing future outcomes is at the core of human cognition (Osvath & Martin-Ordas, 2014). Foresight is critical to any decision we make, so it ‘stands to reason’ that we should constructively engage with futures thinking in order to improve our present decision making. Science, for example, has been able to provide some insights into possible future outcomes, firm in natural (“the sun will rise tomorrow”) but not so firm in social sciences (“current technological changes will result in a loss of jobs and work-based identity”). Still, even in the social arena, it is possible to foresee multiple outcomes of a certain action and even have a discussion on the likelihood and plausibility of these outcomes. This may then lead towards the best possible strategies to create wanted and avoid not-wanted futures, if it were not for futures fallacies.
Futures fallacies prevent both certain types of knowing as well as connecting knowing with action – ‘doing something about it’. We can simultaneously (vaguely) know and not (truly) know. And then not act even on what is known. This is also not a recent phenomenon. Exasperated philosophers, psychologists and futurists have frequently evoked the ancient Greek myth of Cassandra, a young woman cursed by the god Apollo, who gave her the ability to prophesize and then took revenge for her refusal of his advances: “You will always be right about your prophecies, Cassandra, that is my gift, but nobody will ever believe you, that is my punishment and spell”! To this day, Cassandra symbolises “the agony of foreknowledge combined with the impotence to do anything about it” (Twelve Monkeys, 1995).
Certainly, predictions and prophecies are not the same as “trend analysis, foresight and far-sight” (MOD, 2014: xxv). The whole field of futures studies is dedicated to providing insight into both hindsight and foresight, and in order to prevent un-sight. That work, the work futurists do, is made more difficult than it needs to be, as quite a bit of energy is wasted on ‘rediscovering the wheel’ or on ‘convincing’ people that certain changes are indeed not only coming but already underway. In a similar vein to logical fallacies or historical follies, certain irrational yet common delusions when thinking specifically about the future also exist. These thinking patterns can make our future less prosperous and present more strenuous than they could be.
Common Futures Fallacies
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Since we cannot know something which has not yet happened, knowledge about the future comprises “ideas and assumptions about the future, images and visions of the futures as well as the investigation of causalities that bring the logical consequences of certain events and trajectories” (Milojević, 2005:17). Given that the future is not predetermined, and that we cannot really study something which has not yet happened, every study of the future is “strictly speaking, the study of ideas about the future” (Cornish cited in Wagar, 1996:366). It is an inquiry, or “the study of possibilities that are plausible in terms of present– day knowledge and theory” (Wagar, 1996: 366). Our role, as futurists, is to “systematically study possible, probable and preferable futures including the worldviews and myths that underlie each future” (Inayatullah, 2013:37).
The following list of futures fallacies is not intended to be used in order to ‘colonise’ the future, suppress ‘alternative viewpoints’ or ascertain the ‘objective truth’ of the matter. Rather, the intent is to assist with making more informed choices between alternative futures. The intent is also to unearth commonly implicit views of the future in order to facilitate preventative evidence-based policymaking as well as to address conspiracy ideation and other irrational propositions. Ideally, the fallacies presented can be used as an initial checklist to ensure mistakes in policy and strategy are reduced. Certainly, not all fallacies have been covered and, of course, we are likely to continue to make new errors. The list is not exhaustive as non-English texts are not used, nor is there an attempt to engage in alternative epistemologies. That is, the focus in this essay is on errors already confirmed in studies within numerous fields such as Social Psychology, Behavioural Economics, Policy Studies, Organizational Change, Planning, and, of course, Futures Studies, itself. The list is based on a forthcoming monograph, where these fallacies are described in detail and where antidotes to our common delusions when thinking about the future are also offered.
| Futures Fallacy | Definition | Reason for/Benefit | Cost |
| Linear projection (Dorr, 2016) | The error of “presuming that future change will be a simple and steady extension of past trends” | Gives direction | Inability to accommodate for emerging issues |
| Ceteris paribus (Dorr, 2016) | The error of “considering only one single aspect of change while holding ‘all else equal’” | Simplifies complexity | Missing other factors |
| The arrival (Dorr, 2016) | The error of “envisioning possible futures as static objects such as destination or goal rather than as snapshots of an inherently dynamic process” | Closure | Reduction of dynamism |
| The planning | The error of over-promising due to an “optimistic bias in prediction” | Generates action | Financial, psychological, social and temporal |
| The prediction | The error of believing it is possible to predict the future | Certainty | Cynicism towards futures work |
| Over-inflated agency | The error of not being able to separate conspiratory politics – “real-world covert and clandestine activities” (Bale, 2007) – from conspiratorial ideation such as conspiracy theories | Relegates and reaffirms responsibility | Scapegoating
Disempowerment |
| Future negation | The error of denying the existence of the future because ‘there is only now/the present moment’ | Present bias and preference for immediate gratification | ‘Shock’ when the future turns into the present |
| Time imbalance | The error of the unconscious cognitive response style known as an internal time perspective (Zimbardo, 1999) favouring either the past, the present or the future, rather than using the tenses as appropriate | Search for certainty and simplicity (back to the past fallacy)
Seeking pleasure (present centredness fallacy) Escapism (overinflated futures fallacy) |
Inability to adequately respond to change
Inability to utilise different time perspectives as (time and place) appropriate |
| Present-attention | The error of ignoring or minimising phenomena that exist but which cannot be remembered or retrieved with ease in the present moment | Ease of retrieval from memory | Narrow focus on the latest newsworthy issue |
| Future personal exemption | The error of being overly optimistic about one’s own future despite the realistic or even dystopian take on our collective futures | Protects from difficult and inconvenient truths | Hard to sustain |
Conclusion
The abovementioned fallacies are indicative of our general difficulties with prevention. As we collectively assume the future will remain very similar to what is in front of and around us, we often fail to implement strategies more likely to bring about the futures we truly desire. Futures fallacies relate to phenomena that cannot be easily explained by other shared human traits such as laziness (e.g. “cannot be bothered to recycle”) or different interests, politics and priorities (e.g. “environment vs economy”). Rather, they refer to certain mistaken thinking patterns that cannot be justified in the face of logic and rationality. Futures fallacies are an example of our delusional thinking and behaviours that are not thought through, but that we nonetheless continue to repeat. Futurists usually have an intuitive sense of some of these fallacies when discussing our individual and collective futures. Psychologists have, however, run multiple experiments in controlled conditions, trying to discern the specifics behind this general human tendency. This essay is an attempt to enhance the conversation between the two fields, and provide insight into the “predictable irrationality” (Ariely, 2009) of thinking specifically about the future.
About the Author
Dr. Ivana Milojević is a researcher, writer and educator with a trans-disciplinary professional background in sociology, education, gender, peace and futures studies and Director of Metafuture and Metafuture School. She has held professorships at several universities and has conducted research, delivered speeches and facilitated workshops for governmental and academic institutions, international associations, and non-governmental organizations around the world. Dr. Milojević can be contacted at ivana@metafuture.org
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- This essay is based on a larger monograph and journal article on Futures Fallacies (forthcoming). ↑
- I would like to thank Charmaine Sevil of Sevil.co (www.sevilco.com.au) for her assistance with images. ↑
- The Big Bang Theory TV Series 9 Episode 07 – The Spock Resonance ↑
- https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/hegels-critique-of-metaphysics/what-is-rational-is-actual-what-is-actual-is-rational/95C78A980666BD6706D1009A1A3CFD95 ↑
- https://www.movementsinfilm.com/dogme-95 ↑
- I would like to thank the anonymous referee for expressing this position so clearly and succinctly. ↑
- Ibid. ↑
