by Sebastian Bollien
On the 9th of August 2020, the presidential elections of Belarus ended officially with a landslide victory of Alexander Lukashenko, the head of state since 1994. Despite the fact, that no presidential election of this century considered to be free and fair by international observers (Shotter & Seddon, 2020), the reaction of the civil society has never been as severe and far-reaching. It resulted in month-long mass protests throughout the country and governmental answers with increasing numbers of arrests, convictions, terror, and violence. The evident rigging of the election, repression against opposition or journalists and the severe protests from the civil society led in the aftermath to isolation and several sanctions by the EU (European Council, 2020), who until today did not recognize the election results. Many key figures, among them presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya, left the country and are forced to work abroad.
The year 2020 showed like no other year before the breakup of a long-lasting societal contract between the Belarussian government and the newly formed modernized civil society demanding fair elections (Sahm, 2020). Now, more than half a year after the election, the protests slowed down, and it seems that the state authority regained control and the goal of a peaceful and democratic power transition seem contained. This paper will analyse the possible outcome of the breakup of the societal contract using methods of strategic foresight. With the help of a future triangle, the current push- and pull-factors of a democratic power transition can be visualised and compared to current trends. Furthermore, future scenarios will be introduced and concluded with a Casual Layered Analysis (CLA) on the potential problem of undemocratic power transition.
Mapping the plausible futures
1- Futures Triangle (Kuosa, 2017)
The competing dynamics of plausible futures are the past, the present and the (visionary) future. The “Futures triangle” (see picture 1), developed by Sohail Inayatullah (2007), maps today’s view of the future through these three dimensions. The pulls of the visionary future, pushes of the present (quantitative drivers and trends that are changing the future) and weights of the past (barriers to the change we wish to see) (Inayatullah, Six Pillars: futures thinking of transformation, 2008).
Taking the current situation in Belarus it is evident, that despite the fact that current president Lukashenko uses his power to maintain the status quo of the past decades, new factors and parties appeared that can change the balance within the futures triangle and hence increase the number of plausible futures.
The vision of a democratic power transition through elections is a component even in autocratic regimes as it helps in legitimizing the acting government. As the understanding of the term differs on the point of view, it can be used as a visionary future and hence as a pull-factor for Belarussian plausible futures. To compare push factors and weights, current sociological, technical, economic, and political trends are used (STEP-approach):
Societal
Throughout his 26-year long presidency, Lukashenko faced resistance. In 2020, however, we could observe a new societal class rising and politicising itself primiparous. Journalists, Bloggers, IT-workers increased their political ambitions and as such broke the long-lasting societal contract of a de-politicised society. Within that movement are also industrial workers, who mostly work within state owned enterprises, starting strikes in the aftermath of the election. The politicised society puts values like honesty, transparency, and dignity on the agenda. This is especially visible after the first wave of state repressions and arrests against potential presidential candidates Viktor Babaryka or Sjarhey Tsikhanousky, whose wife Sventlana went for candidacy in his name, turning to be the key-figure of a new feminist movement (Gapova, 2020).
This societal trends and movements counter the long-lasting state will of an un-politicised society of political subjects rather than objects and represents a clear weight of the past.
Technological
In the past decade, Belarus rose its reputation in the international IT community. The state supported young start-ups with low taxes and provided infrastructure, as the IT sector helped to raise exports. The brand “wargaming” with its bestseller “World of tanks” for instance counts more than 160 million players worldwide. In 2020 the sector employed around 100.000 people and overrun the construction sector in the gross domestic product in 2018 (Murphy, 2020). Next to the IT sector, the society itself shows more interconnectivity. The numbers of smartphones and social media accounts rose in the last decade as in most other countries. The internet as the source of information is as important as the TV (Sjachovic, 2020). This development enables citizens to receive unfiltered information, increases transparency and hence serves as a push factor.
While the government fostered the rise of the IT sector and allowed the partly decoupling from the state centred agricultural and production sector, the aftermath of the election showed that the final control lies within the authorities. They identified the new sector fast as the origin and accelerator of the mass protests and damaged its reputation and ability to work so that scientists predict an ongoing “brain drain” (Murphy, 2020).
Economic
Despite the rising IT-sector, Belarus (Statista, 2020) still obtains a much higher share in the economic sectors of “agriculture” and “production” than for instance Germany (Statista, 2021). Shortly after the collapse of Soviet Union and the begin of Lukashenko’s presidency the wave of economic liberalisation as seen in other Central Eastern European states stopped and turned back to a state capitalist model, in which around 60% of enterprises are directly linked to the state. Next to it, foreign trade is highly dependent on Russian in- and exports (Götz, 2020). The centralist model leads to a strengthening of state-control, contained inflation pressures and a decoupling of the international economy. These are heavy weights of the past, as links the economy to the state and the state to the economy, new visions are suppressed, and innovation hampered so that the status quo remains. The new generation of workers and intellectuals, partly with international education, however, stand for a push factor to foster changes.
Political
Rohava and Burkardt describe the long-lasting authoritarian regime in Belarus as electoral, personalist and hegemonial (2020). Lukashenko is the key figure in a power-vertical that allows elections but controls them likewise. (State) careers depend on the goodwill of the leaders. Lukashenko, immediately after gaining power, changed the constitution in a non-recognized referendum and centralized it around him. Independent institutions like the constitutional court de facto act as “notary of an authoritarian regime” (Rohava & Burkhardt, 2020, p. 132). Massive repression from above led to crowd outs of non-state and international organisations within Belarus and with-it advocacies of free media, free opinions, and transparency.
This power vertical represents a huge weight of the past. The political opposition hence has not been able to create institutions and organisations before the 2020 elections. The huge protests out of the horizontal organized and connected opposition led to the creation of the Belarussian Coordination Council short after the elections, which claims to be a legitimate organ to facilitate the democratic transfer of power as nearly every political oppositionist gathers until its umbrella. Yet many of them out of a political exile.
Picture 2 illustrates the future triangle with the explained push-factors and weights towards the vision of a democratic power transition in Belarus:
2- Future Triangle Belarus (own graphic)
Emerging issues
The Belarussian protests after the elections gained international attention. Although it was not the first rigged election, the obviousness of this one led to many states not recognizing the official results and demanding new elections to support the will of the civil society. Belarus since the end of the Cold War played a special role between Russia and the West. Lukashenko for many years knew how to play that game of balancing both interests. Even for its defence, Belarus developed own solutions and avoided dependence on any side. The economic sanctions by the EU, although not far-reaching, led Lukashenko turn eastwards again. Belarus recently bought equipment from Russia, contrary to the former policy of own development, and changed its official rhetoric in favour of the East (Bohdan, 2020). Moscow welcomes this trend, as its policy remains the increased connection and dependence of the “near abroad”.
The centralized state managed to press the civil movement down for now, yet, the connectivity of the civil society, the international education, new forms of media and feminist movements do exist. The society clearly demonstrated that it does not want to be treated as subjects of the leadership, broadens its way of media consumption, and lacks trust in the government in for instance Lukashenko’s (not) handling of the COVID-19 crisis. The IT-sector presents itself as the most innovative and free. In the future, the influence of external actors as the European Union, International organisations, Russia, or international money flows will be able to shift balances in the future triangle from outside, while intellectuals and the new generation of protesters and connected citizens will try it from within.
Short term Scenarios
3- Scenario Cross Belarus 2025 (own graphic)
In the current situation, we can observe several trends, yet, up until now, the status-quo reminds in Belarus. The next presidential elections will be in 2025 and as such serves as the point of outlook. While current emerging issues and push-factors are suppressed by the regime, its stability depends on two double variables. Internally, the civil society showed unconsent with the regime, and externally the balance between the East and West and the question if Belarus will be ultimately turn into the Russian or European sphere. The scenario cross helps to reduce uncertainty (Picture 3) and considers the change progression starting from the most current to the one that implies the most societal change.
Scenario 1 – The last European dictator
The label as the last European dictator Lukashenko prominently got by Western media years ago. Hardly anything has changed in his way of governing the country and most likely, hardly anything will change. He stands for an authoritarian regime legitimized by itself. The geographical position of Belarus demanded a balancing between the East and the West, as Belarus is in the heartland of Central Eastern Europe. The centralised state institutions, including the KGB and police forces, are depended on the system. Hence, we can expect, that they will continue to repress civilian movements and emerging trends before they consolidate.
At the same time, Lukashenko out of purely economic reasons, need to find a way to build up bridges to the West again. A lot of exports go through Baltic harbours, and minorities of neighbouring countries request eased travel. With a legitimized government from within, perhaps with a constitutional reform, he will try to regain peoples trust and the popular vote. EU sanctions will be lifted, and the market opened again. At the same time, the EU is interested to keep Belarus as a sovereign barrier between EU and Russia with a “healthy distance” to Russia.
Scenario 2 – Tool of Putin
The year 2020 marked a year with severe changes of the Belarus foreign politics. For decades, Belarus found the balance between the opening towards European markets and the stability of Russian needs for a barrier towards the West. In the second scenario, it will be evident, that the breakup towards the European Union is too severe to be kitted. To stay in stable power, Russia will act as a protector and be able to open locations and military on Belarussian soil. Lukashenko’s legitimacy will be derived from Putin’s goodwill and as such untouched by the West. Civil movements will continue to face suppression by state authorities, backed by Russian hybrid and actual force. Many oppositionists are forced to exile and not able to form movements. At the same time, Belarus offers the reintroduction of the societal contract, where the state takes care of all the basic needs of the citizens and regains trust.
Scenario 3 – Russian brothers
The civil movement cannot stay unrecognized and remain a factor of destabilisation for the Lukashenko regime. In this scenario of adaptive change, Russia, out of historical reasons, is able to take control of the civil movement, as it supports its will for a change of power. To move towards this scenario, Russia will use the identified “weights of the past” but also advocate the present push factors of the society towards more transparency and the implementation of new societal groups into the governmental institutions. At the same time, the foreign agent rhetoric will prevail and the dependence on Russian energy supplies, foreign direct investment and military protection will influence the society towards Eastern rhetoric. Civil interconnection-programs will be set up.
As seen in Crimea and Donbass, Russia could use its passport policies and huge infrastructural investments to gain popular support and to strengthen its ties in the region. However, the scenario goes along with a lot of uncertainties when Russia starts actively supporting the civil movement.
Scenario 4 – European integration
The emerging civil movement was pushed back by unusually high governmental force. This repressive answer of the regime towards the first demonstrations was a catalyst to accelerate the following mass protests throughout the country. The intellectual and modern civil society, especially the youngest generation, primarily women demand changes of the patristic authoritarian regime and find support in the liberal ideas of the West, independent media, and activists abroad.
Russia leaves Lukashenko’s attempts for aid unanswered. Controlled instability favours dependence and further financing of the Belarussian economy. In addition, Putin’s focus lies on the regions around the Black Sea and Middle East much more than in the Baltics in the closest vicinity of NATO. Economic problems lead to pulling finances back to the core institutions of the securitisation of his presidency, leaving more and more citizens facing poverty and worsening livelihoods.
This helps the civilian movement finally to constitute itself in the horizontal reaching to all members of society. The pressure from below and the open hand of the European Union to support the movement for democracy ultimately will lead to Lukashenko’s resignation and opening a door for democratic reforms in Belarus. This scenario implies the most radical changes of the current governmental and societal setup.
Conclusion
“Democratic power transition” is a vision that implies many plausible futures. The core essence is its legitimacy towards the inner and outer sphere of the state. The issue of non-democratic power transition is rooted deep and for a long term within the society. A Casual Layered analysis (CLA) can “unpack an issue” (Inayatullah, 2017) looks not only the litany and as such, the visible headlines, but deepens the issue to the less visible systemic and worldview.
4- CLA Belarus (own graphic)
It is not enough to see the headlines of thrown ballots, faked vote-counts or preventing of candidacies to deduce an undemocratic system, as the simple solution would appear to let the people count fairly next time. However, the system itself prevents it. Lukashenko’s strong power vertical helped to let the state infiltrate every administration. While the city council of Hrodna in West-Belarus actually allowed peaceful protests for several days after this election, the system of Lukashenko interfered immediately, defaming the protests as organized by Poland, quickly exchanging people in charge, organizing (legal) protests in favour of the president, and forbidding other demonstrations (Ackermann, 2020).
As many other countries in the Central Eastern European region, Belarus started to find its national identity in the aftermath of the First World War and the end of the great Russian empire. The quick integration into the Soviet Union hindered the process. While, after the collapse of Soviet Union, other satellite states for instance the Baltics, Ukraine, Poland or Czech Republic and Slovakia could continue this process, the identity building in Belarus stopped again due to the Lukashenko system. Up until now, his public speeches are rarely in Belarussian language, national symbols derived from the 19th century like the “Pahonja” coat of arms, and the white-red-white flag were dismantled again in favour for symbols that remind of the communist times.
To change the worldview and finish the national identity building it takes a huge effort and it requires distinction from the paternalistic and Russian dominated worldview. In a metaphorical way we can say that Belarus has become a young adult some years ago but did not find the courage yet to leave the protection of the family home. The mass protests of Belarus 2020 are in many ways similar to the Solidarnosc-movement in Poland in the early 1980s. An emancipated opposition manifested for the first time and presents problems for the current power verticals and presents a possible solution on the deeper layer.
The current answers of the regime are repression, harassment, and violence. Yet, the economic dependencies, the national isolation in a globalised world and the increasingly international and intellectual young generation are strong push-factors for Belarus to continue the process because as the costs for all side rise with its duration and does not keep the young adult happy at home. The consolidation and emancipation of the civil society which is ready to move out of the parental protection, however, added new variables and push-factors in favour to future scenarios and democratic changes became more plausible despite the current litany. But the idea, that the near future scenarios are focused on the movement from the bottom to the top remains less plausible than from top to bottom. Therefore, the influence and incentives from the Eastern and Western neighbours will play a larger role for the near future as it not on the least influences their national security and economic policy strategies in a direct way.
Author
Sebastian Bollien is a member of the centre for strategic foresight of the German Federal Academy of Security Policy (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik).
Office E-Mail: StrategischeVorausschau@baks.bund.de
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