By James Balzer
Introduction
The American conservative polity averts climate change action for numerous social and economic reasons. Contemporary conservatism’s distrust of institutions promotes an aversion towards impositional government agendas, including climate change policy (Buzogany & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Lockwood, 2018). Such distrust derives from the sustained neglect of post-industrial jurisdictions by political institutions, especially in rural, lower socio-economic and non-coastal geographies (Lockwood, 2018). Consequently, such communities, many still dependent on carbon-intensive industries, fear the possible contribution of government climate policy to deriding long-term job security (Buzogany & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Lockwood, 2018; Hermville & Sanderink, 2019).
Therefore, creating an ‘authorising environment’ for climate action in such communities depends on 2 overarching determinants: trust in institutions and confidence in long-term job security. As seen in Figure 1 and 2, by applying these determinants to double variate scenarios (Inayatullah, 2013), grounded in Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) (Inayatullah, 1998), three alternative conservative climate futures can be hypothesised:
- Techno-skepticism
- Eco-libertarianism
- Breakthrough
However, these scenarios must be underpinned by strong path dependencies to ensure their long-term success, irrespective of the political authorising environment.
Developing path dependency depends on 3 ‘diagnostic questions’ (DQs) as proposed by Levin et al. (2012)
- DQ1: What can be done to create stickiness making reversibility immediately difficult?
- DQ2: What can be done to entrench support over time?
- DQ3: What can be done to expand the population that supports the policy?
This article assesses each conservative climate future against these DQs, exploring the feasibility and prerequisites necessary for each climate future. In doing so, it explores the characteristics necessary to create medium to long decarbonisation path dependencies in these scenarios.
Figure 1 – Scenario Mapping for Conservative Climate Futures (method from Inayatullah, 2013)
Figure 2 – Causal Layered Analysis for Each Climate Future (method from Inayatullah, 1998)
Understanding Aversion to Climate Action Amongst the Conservative Polity
The scenarios mapped in Figure 1 derive from literature exploring the intersection of conservative populism and climate skepticism. The historical and sociological institutionalism underpinning contemporary American conservatism has undermined trust in institutions, corroding the institutional capacity and will to combat climate change (Buzogany & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Lockwood, 2018). The degradation of working class living standards and economic conditions has provided a pretext for the rise of populist conservatism in the US (Hornsey et al., 2018; Fiorino, 2022). Often coined ‘MAGA’ conservatives, or adherents to ‘Trumponomics’, this strain of conservatism emphasises traditional and localised values over notions of big government or paternalistic institutions. While such concepts are a hallmark of traditional conservatism, in light of the damaging consequences of globalisation, it has adopted a hostile sentiment to institutions and mainstream politics, often decrying ideas of the ‘deep state’ and ‘global elites’ (Buzogany & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Fiorino, 2022). This resists international efforts and institutions, including those addressing climate change, proliferating the ‘David and Goliath’ metaphor of the ‘Status Quo’ climate future in Figure 2.
Consequently, a lacking trust of government institutions is a common determinant of support for populist ideologies (Huber et al., 2022; Krange et al., 2021). This is embedded in the ‘drain the swamp’ worldview of the ‘Status Quo’ climate future in Figure 2, grounded in a belief that climate action is for the detached “self-serving elite” (Huber et al., 2022, p.1115). Additionally, there is strong correlation between anti-institutionalist conspiratorial ideation and climate skepticism (Hornsey et al., 2018). Furthermore, the belief that scientific research and discourse is exclusionary, especially as it applies to environmental policymaking, leads to skepticism of climate change policy as informed by scientists (Sarathchandra & Haltinner, 2019; Huber et al., 2022).
Likewise, fears of declines in job security due to decarbonisation exacerbate conservative aversion to climate action (Fiorino, 2022; Hermville & Sanderink, 2019). This includes narratives of “stymied progress” and the “story of decline”, particularly exacerbated by former President Trump and the fossil fuel industry, promoting fossil fuel employees as ‘heroes’ and proponents of decarbonisation as ‘villians’ (Hermville & Sanderink, 2019, p.49). Furthermore, the fears of detached “elites” dictating potentially job threatening decarbonisation agendas is a strong underpinning force in conservative populist belief systems (Fiorino, 2022, p.804). This is because of its threat to traditional lifestyles, industries and the “ordinary rural citizens” (Buzogany and Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021, p.157). This aligns with the ‘David and Goliath’ metaphor in the ‘Status Quo’ scenario in Figure 2.
Fears of institutions and job insecurity is complemented by other practices of institutionalism, namely the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in influencing ‘upstream’ democratic processes (Boswell, 2016). Such interests work in tandem with the conservative ideological stifling of climate action, impacting the point of political ‘will formation’ (see Boswell, 2016). Additionally, media bias has accentuated these sentiments among the conservative polity, facilitating ideological entrenchment amongst the political ‘authorising environment’ (Silverblatt, 2004). In this context, it is hard to enable an ‘authorising environment’ or have ‘political capacity’ for long term, coherent climate action (see O’Flynn, 2021; Wu et al., 2015).
Given the 2 overarching determinants of sentiments towards climate policy, the double variable scenario in Figure 1 has been formulated. This method has been chosen because of its coherent focus on the overarching determinants of attitudes to climate policy, as demonstrated by academic literature.
Establishing Decarbonisation Path Dependency
Given this lacklustre authorising environment, a strong ‘path dependency’ is required for a sustained and scalable uptake of climate change policies (Levin et al., 2012). ‘Path dependency’ is the ability to implement an initiative in such a way that reneging on the initiative is detrimental and counter-productive, regardless of alternating political influences across electoral cycles.
Specifically, Levin et al. (2012) determines three characteristics are necessary to ensure long term path dependency:
- Sticky interventions that…
- Entrench support over time, and that…
- Expand the populations they cover over time
According to Levin et al. (2012), path dependency also requires the following attributes:
- Lock-in: Occurs when a policy intervention contains a logic that gives it immediate durability
- Self-reinforcing: Policy interventions in which the costs of reversal increase over time
- Increasing Returns: Where benefits for an intervention increase over time. This promotes entrenchment
- Positive Feedback: Reinforcing support from the initial target population by getting others outside this target population to join
Additionally, the uptake of policies can follow an ‘adoption curve’ (Figure 3), which is adapted from the Molitor Forecasting Model (see Molitor, 2003). This demonstrates the different segments of adopters over time in relation to a policy. Creating path dependency for a policy requires strong traction amongst ‘early adopters’ and the ‘early majority’, from which a critical mass of adopters can sustain and scale further traction, as outlined in Molitor (2003).
Figure 3 – An Adoption Curve Model (adapted from Molitor, 2003)
This article extrapolates the three conservative climate futures of ‘Techno-skepticism’, ‘Eco-libertarianism’ and ‘Breakthrough’ through the lens of the three DQs and to what extent path dependent characteristics are demonstrated in each scenario. This ascertains the pre-requisites and legitimacy of each climate future.
Climate Future 1: Techno-Skepticism
In the CLA, this climate future is characterised by a fear of technocentric green transitions that focus on technical and commercial outcomes more than socially equitable ones. The underlying metaphor, ‘the story of Icarus’, implies an overly ambitious and rapid transition that undermines socio-economic wellbeing and prosperity. However, there is a renewed faith and interest in government and institutional agendas to drive decarbonisation, leading to the ‘cautious curiosity’ worldview associated with this climate future.
Therefore, achieving this climate future would depend on remedying the determinants of institutional distrust in contemporary conservative communities. This would include ameliorating social division and sociology-economic inequity in affected communities. This can strengthen social cohesion and trust, consequently restoring trust in institutions (see Bremer et al., 2021). However, in this climate future, the advances and socio-economic benefits of green energy are unknown, especially regarding emergent technology such as hydrogen, batteries and distributed energy. The community feel the ‘pattern disruption’ is akin to an inequitable and unregulated industrial revolution. There appears to be a lack of direction and communication of the socio-economic benefits to the community, thus proliferating the ‘Story of Icarus’ metaphor. This beckons the need for strong regulations and government assurances. This could include a blend of public-private financing to ensure a just transition – facilitating energy transitions in a manner conducive with socio-economic equity (Krawchenko & Gordon, 2021; Global Compact Network, 2019).
As per Levin et al. (2012), to ensure this climate future’s ‘stickiness’, the socio-economic risks of fossil fuels dependency for employment need to be communicated and understood by the community. Likewise, the exact instruments for a just transition need to be communicated and understood. Furthermore, clear just transition regulations need to be introduced by all levels of government, perhaps similar to the EU just transition fund and plan, or the New Mexico Energy Transition Act (see Aklin & Urpelainen, 2022).
To ‘entrench’ the idea, clear incremental socio-economic benefits need to be obvious and communicated in each phase to full decarbonisation. This would likely involve clear social risk management planning. Importantly, government-to-society consultations in a just transition can be understood through a tripartite framework. This includes a multi-stakeholder and social dialogue approach, mixed with more top-down government-led, technocentric policies (Romo, 2022). It has also been suggested the US government use Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data and civil society to identify regions most at risk and the types of workers who need the most support in the process of decarbonisation (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2022). Therefore, complementing government intervention, civil society organisations, such as trade unions, can play an active role in facilitating this climate future, including the perpetuation of National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDIs) (Romo, 2022; Stevia & Felli, 2014). In particular, a just transition needs to be focused on a ‘jobs-focused’ agenda and a ‘society-focused’ agenda, thus acknowledging social equity (Romo, 2022). This viewpoint aligns with a ‘differentiated responsibility’ approach, which suggests states have a moral responsibility toward workers impacted by environmental regulations (Stevis & Felli, 2014).
To ‘expand’ support, the socio-economic benefits of decarbonisation and risk planning would need to be effective and communicated to other communities of similar characteristics. Additionally, social security systems are typically underused in facilitating a just transition, where methods might include providing flexible repayment timelines for those who have lost their employment, such as an employment insurance system, or establishing early pensions for specific industries (Krawchenko & Gordon, 2021). Furthermore, direct funding for community level economic development needs great capacitation. This indicates the need for greater community and local economy investment instead of just investment in re-skilling and employment for affected workers (Krawchenko & Gordon, 2021).
In relation to such, the International Energy Agency (IEA) ‘Commission on People-centred Clean Energy Transitions’ has 12 recommendations for facilitating a just transition (International Energy Agency, 2021, p.2). Pursuing this climate future requires an application of recommendation of “involve the public through participation and communication”, “incorporate gender, equality and social inclusion” and “ensure that policies enhance social and economic development, and improve quality of life”.
Climate Future 2: Eco-libertarianism
In the CLA, this climate future is characterised by a sustained distrust of institutions, but a renewed faith in the commercial prospects of a green transition, including the role of eco-entrepreneurs. This underlying metaphor, ‘Greta meets Reagan’, implies a more anti-government, pro-libertarian and pro-commercial appreciation of decarbonisation. This also underpins the ‘anti-paternalism’ worldview of this climate future, reminiscent of existing right-wing libertarian movements, such as the Tea Party.
This future depends on an appreciation of the technological, social and economic benefits of decarbonisation among the conservative polity. It has a more market oriented means of decarbonisation, aligning with the conservative affinity for small government and free markets. Even if the governments are unhelpful, market forces driving decarbonisation are beneficial and robust.
As per Levin et al. (2012), to ensure the ‘stickiness’ of this climate future, the socio-economic consequences of sustained dependence on fossil fuels for employment need to be communicated and understood by the community. Concurrently, the commercial opportunities and benefits of a technocentric pathway to decarbonisation needs to be realised by the community. This requires a focus on social sustainability and a strong Sustainable Development License to Operate (SDLO) principles (see Pedro et al., 2017).
To ‘entrench’ the idea, incremental socio-economic benefits would need to be obvious and communicated each phase along the way to a full decarbonisation. This would likely involve clear social risk management planning by commercial actors, working with communities and civil society (The Grantham Research Institute, 2018). Much of this depends on strong corporate social responsibility and the investment of commercial activity to assist transitioning communities (Just Transition Centre, 2018). Additionally, there is an increasing emphasis on board rooms considering a ‘5 capitals’ approach regarding social, environmental and economic dimensions of decarbonisation (Figure 4). This can be a framework for commercial actors to realise and manifest just transition principles (World Economic Forum, 2022). Additionally, this approach can create stronger systemic change to facilitate a sustainable, equitable and prosperous just transition (World Economic Forum, 2022). Additionally, commercial actors also need to recognise commercial incentives for a just transition, including stronger ESG credentialisation and reputational benefits (Just Transition Centre, 2018). 
Figure 4 – A 5 Capitals Model for Corporate Boards
Source: World Economic Forum (2022)
To ‘expand’ support, the socio-economic benefits of decarbonisation would need to be effective and communicated to other communities of similar characteristics. Furthermore, wide scale ESG investment, with an emphasis on the ‘S’ in ESG, needs to be realised and proliferated across a wide range of stakeholders (The Grantham Research Institute, 2018). Financial instruments such as Transition Bonds and Sustainability Bonds should be used. Similar to the ‘techno-skepticism’ scenario, civil society organisations, such as unions, can play a role in getting a more equitable outcome for members of the community (Stevis & Felli, 2014).
Climate Future 3: Breakthrough
In the CLA, this climate future is characterised by a high level of trust in institutions and a high level of trust in job security in the context of decarbonisation. While difficult, the combination of these characteristics can facilitate a strong ‘authorising environment’ for climate action even amongst politically conservative individuals and communities. This drives the ‘new paradigm’ worldview in this climate future, invoking a strong ‘bridging the chasm’ metaphor.
In turn, it can establish a strong path dependency. It is possible technological innovations such as hydrogen, battery storage and community power sharing can clearly demonstrate socio-economic co-benefits alongside the clear environmental benefits. However, perpetuating trust in institutions is a more multifaceted process.
As per Levin et al. (2012), to create ‘stickiness’ in this scenario, a combination of political, commercial and technological phenomena need to coalesce. Regarding trust in job security, technological innovations that create suitable replacements to existing industries will need to manifest and be well understood. In regard to trust in institutions, there is a need for political will in assisting communities and creating high levels of inclusivity and equity. The politics underpinning such a policy agenda requires a strong realisation of benevolent and equitable outcomes in targeted communities. Examples to assist this include the federal Just Transition for Energy Communities Bill, which intends to create a Department of Treasury program to fund just transition programs. Likewise, Biden has set aside $16 million under the management of the Department of Energy to create a roadmap for communities with historical ties to fossil fuel extraction (US Department of Energy, 2021).
To ‘entrench’ this climate future, it is necessary to perpetuate the socio-economic benefits of decarbonisation to more conservative communities. This includes the uptake and acknowledgement of these benefits by ‘early adopters’ and ‘early majority’, as demonstrated in Figure 3. Once a critical mass of individuals recognise these benefits, upscaling becomes much easier.
Examples include provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) providing $5 billion to support $250 billion in low-cost loans for utilities reducing coal debt and reinvesting in clean technologies (O’Boyle, 2022). Additionally, 2 IRA provisions are designed to unlock low-cost financing for utilities, vastly reducing the cost of retiring existing coal generation by 2030. This also lowers electricity costs for customers, and enabling a just transition for fossil fuel communities (O’Boyle, 2022). There is also a push for a US federal Just Transition Office to ensure there is a coherent nationwide approach to equitable decarbonisation (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2022).
This is also the prerequisite to ‘expand’ this climate future. To ‘expand’, it largely depends on the self-reinforcement and positive feedback loops of the characteristics in the ‘breakthrough’ scenario. This is largely determined by the tangible and realised returns across the social and economic dimensions of this climate future. Additionally, a variety of levels of government, including state and local governments, need to adopt best practice just transition policies. Existing examples include state legislation for just transitions, including the New Mexico Energy Transition Act.
Conclusion
The distrust of institutions and job insecurity, perceived as synonymous with climate change action, diminishes the will of the US conservative polity to pursue climate change action. In this respect, climate change is a ‘wicked problem’, as defined by Levin et al. (2012). However, there are particular scenarios and path dependency prerequisites that can enable long term climate change policy amongst these polity members. These involve improved faith in institutions and belief in the socio-economic benefits of climate change policy, including confidence in job security.
This article has explored the determinants of path dependency for climate change policy among American conservatives. It gleans the complex and multifaceted factors dismantling an authorising environment for climate action, and subsequently extrapolates how to overcome these factors in developing path dependency.
The research is more hypothetical and high level, indicating the need for more comprehensive and location specific research in regard to this topic area. Furthermore, alternative frameworks and methods to understand decarbonisation path dependencies could be applied to develop new perspectives and recommendations.
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Author Affiliations
James Blazer | Region: Oceania | Country: Australia
